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USING FAIR RETURN PRICES TO ASSESS THE VALUE AND
COST OF FINANCIAL GUARANTEES FOR NEW NUCLEAR
POWER PLANTS
Bernell K. Stone*

ABSTRACT
Financial guarantees change risk and therefore change the cost of
financing and the return required by investors. Financial guarantees by
the government are a form of subsidy. They are now pervasive in the
energy sector and are proposed for new nuclear generating plants. Both
the value to recipients and the cost to provide are difficult to assess for
long-lived nonmarketable assets with great uncertainty about
construction cost, operating cost, and prospective revenue. Therefore, in
turn, it is difficult to assess potential costs for providing the guarantees. It
is also difficult to compare financial guarantees with other types of
subsidies (e.g. production credits). This Article adapts the idea of fair
return rate regulation and the associated determination of a fair return
price to the evaluation of a proposed project for generating nuclear
power. Knowing the price required for a given level of return provides an
easy-to-understand framework for assessing the value and cost of
financial guarantees. The analysis can then be based on the difference in
required return with and without guarantees to find the associated
difference in required fair return price.
From the viewpoint of policy analysis and strategic planning, the
merits of using differences in fair return prices include the fact that they
are (1) easy to understand, (2) scale independent, and (3) consistent with
both standard capital investment analysis and the fair return pricing that
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takes place in setting rates at the level of the overall utility. More
importantly, reducing the value/cost of financial guarantees to a
difference in price per kilowatt-hour makes financial guarantees easy to
compare with production credits and other alternative subsidies that
directly impact price and/or that can be easily translated into a price per
kilowatt-hour.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article has two primary purposes. First, it provides a nontechnical overview and illustrative examples of the methodology for
converting input assumptions about the required return on invested
capital as well as assumptions about required capital outlays, operating
costs, and operating efficiency into an associated fair return price.
Second, this Article uses best case operating costs and industry estimates
of the capital outlays to address the four key questions on value, cost,
default probability, and market viability when applied to federal
government debt guarantees for new nuclear power plants.
A debt guarantee refers to a commitment by one party to assume
responsibility for performance on a debt contract or commitment when
the primary party cannot perform. This Article addresses a particular
type of debt guarantee, namely a federal government guarantee for a
substantial portion of the debt of a risky capital investment project (e.g.,
the 80% debt guarantee for new nuclear power plants in the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 1). A federal government debt guarantee is a subsidy.
In order to understand and evaluate federal government debt guarantees
as incentives for undertaking desirable capital investment projects,
policymakers and the public need to understand four critical factors:
(1) Value: The value of the guarantee to the recipient company
or organization must be determined.
(2) Cost: The likely cost to the government (or, ultimately, to
taxpayers) of this subsidy compared to alternative subsidies
and incentives must be determined.
(3) Default Probability and Default Cost: Default probability
refers to the chance that the company/organization receiving
the federal debt guarantee will default so that the federal
government will have to perform on the guarantee. Default
cost is the amount that the government would have to pay to

1. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 [hereinafter Energy Policy Act]
(providing for guarantees of 80% of the financing of new nuclear plants subject to DOE approval).
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honor the guarantee.
(4) Economic Viability: Economic viability refers to the ability to
generate earnings at least sufficient to service the guaranteed
debt and ideally to service all project debt and earn as well at
least a fair return on invested equity. When a substantial
fraction of project debt is guaranteed, having economic
viability is the key requirement for not having default occur
and thus for assessing both default probability and cost.
Because a debt guarantee is a financial subsidy, its value, cost, and
default risk are usually expressed in financial impact terms, such as
change in debt cost, change in debt capacity, change in required project
return, and change in project net present value. 2 While these financial
impact characterizations are understandable to economists and finance
professionals, neither policymakers nor the general public find them easy
to understand or easy to compare with alternative subsidies. Many other
subsidies are either quoted in price terms or can be easily translated into
price impacts.3 For instance, production subsidies are quoted as
additional payments per unit of subsidized production. Tax credits and
other output-based tax benefits per unit of output (such as depletion
allowances) can also be easily translated into a direct price impact. Even
pollution charges can be translated into a change in price required to
recover the charge.
Translating debt guarantees and other financial subsidies into prices
has several benefits. First, prices are easier for policymakers and the
public to understand in terms of value of the incentive to the receiving
company/organization. Second, prices and price impacts are the common
numeraire for the evaluation of most other policies. Therefore,
converting debt guarantees into price impact provides for easier
comparison with alternative policies.4 Finally, for alternative methods of
2. See U.E. Reinhardt, Break-Even Analysis for Lockheed’s Tristar: An Application of
Financial Theory, 27 J. FIN. 821-38 (1972) [hereinafter Reinhardt] (serving as an example of a debt
guarantee evaluated thoroughly in terms of debt cost, overall financing cost, and net present value
(in preference to the simpler payback measure)). The federal debt guarantee for the Lockheed
TriStar and the Reinhardt framework are both summarized more thoroughly infra Section III.
3. In addition to the price subsidies, taxes, and direct charges mentioned here, see Table 23
for a list of ten subsidies to incentivize shale oil development. This list of ten incentives with
summary evaluation including subsidy effect, includes, in addition to loan guarantees, both
subsidized interest and accelerated depreciation as additional financial subsidies. U. S. experience
with shale oil guarantees is treated further in Section III of this Article. See generally, OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL FINANCIAL I NCENTIVES FOR O IL SHALE
DEVELOPMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF SHALE OIL TECHNOLOGIES (1980).
4. Financial subsidies are not alone in being difficult to convert into a price or a price
change. There are other policies, especially pollution regulations capping the level of emissions that
involve uncertain prices and/or that entail capital outlays that are also difficult to reduce to price
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generating electricity, answering the questions of market viability,
likelihood of default, and the ultimate expected cost, can all be reduced
to the price per kilowatt-hour with the debt subsidy compared to
competitive prices from other generation alternatives.
This Article addresses the conversion of federal debt guarantees into
an associated price impact. It focuses on federal debt guarantees for longlived capital investment projects that guarantee a high percentage of the
financing (e.g., the provision for 80% federal debt guarantees for the
financing of new nuclear power plants in the Energy Policy Act of
20055). The key idea is to adapt traditional net present value methods for
capital budgeting to solve for a fair return price (or, a competitive return
price) given assumptions about costs and operating efficiency. 6 The
difference between the fair return price with a federal debt guarantee and
the fair return price without the guarantee is a price-based measure of the
value of the guarantee.
In this Article, fair return price is defined as the price of electricity
that provides a rate of return on invested capital just equal to an assumed
fair return on investment given assumptions about certain factors,
including construction costs (capital outlays), operating costs, operating
efficiency, and plant life. Fair return price in this Article is a marketbased fair return that should reflect current interest rates and risk to both
debt and equity providers. This market-based fair return price is not
necessarily the same as the prices that would be set by a utility
commission to provide a regulatory fair return on invested capital for
regulated electric utilities.7 However, as established in Section IV, they
impacts. One example is the use of caps on overall emission levels (such as carbon caps and overall
greenhouse gas caps) that have a price impact but involve a market trading mechanism to determine
the price impact and therefore have a direct price impact, but with an uncertain price. Another
example is an emission standard (such as maximum levels of sulfur or nitrogen in stack gases) that
requires an investment in pollution control equipment and possibly an additional operating cost and
therefore requires fairly complex economic-engineering analyses to determine the associated price
impact.
5. See Energy Policy Act, supra note 1.
6. ―Capital budgeting‖ refers to the economic evaluation of capital investment projects. See
Harold Bierman, Jr., Section 9: Capital Budgeting, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE (Edward
I. Altman ed., 5th ed. 1986), for easy to read background on net present value capital budgeting
methods with net present value summarized well at 9-17 to 9-21. See also the capital budgeting
chapters of any introductory corporate finance text, such as RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE, (McGraw-Hill Irwin, 5th ed. 2007), especially Chapters
7–9 at 180–263.
7. For background on electric utility rate regulation and especially the idea of a fair return on
invested capital, see generally CHARLES F. PHILIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Public Utility Reports 3d ed. 1993). Chapter 8, ―The Rate Base,‖ treats the
definition of the rate base, that part of invested capital for which investors can claim a right to a fair
return, including the legal cases/precedents up to 1993 pertaining to the rate base. Chapter 9, ―The
Rate of Return,‖ treats judicial fair return issues. In the subsection on ―Judicial Concepts,‖ Philips
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should generally be very close.
Moreover, in today’s deregulated electric power generation market,
the companies/organizations that are the owner-developers of a nuclear
power project are generally not a regulated electric utility.8 Refinement
of this definition as a return able to service debt and provide a fair market
return on invested equity is developed further in Sections IV and V
(including its relation to the regulatory fair return on invested capital)
and illustrated in Sections VI, VII, and VIII.
Section II of this Article provides background information on global
climate change and the current critical role of federal government debt
guarantees in low carbon nuclear electricity strategy for the United
States. Section III provides a background discussion on federal financial
guarantees for capital investment projects. Section IV reviews
frameworks for assessing the value of financial guarantees and focuses
on the adaptation of traditional capital investment project valuation
methods to solve for the fair return price associated with assumptions
about costs and a given discount rate. Section V presents an illustrative
example of this proposed methodology using differences in required
returns with a financial guarantee and without a financial guarantee to
obtain differences in the associated fair return prices. Section VI
discusses the disagreements/uncertainty surrounding both construction
costs and operating costs. Continuing the example introduced in Section
V, it then illustrates cost- based sensitivity analysis by summarizing fair
return prices for a range of possible construction costs. Section VII
continues treating uncertainty in costs and rates. It establishes the
required price per kilowatt-hour with a financial guarantee (i.e., with
low-cost, subsidized financing) as a critical and easy-to-understand
measure of economic viability. The proposed viability assessment is a
straightforward comparison of the fair return price with either current
prices or with electricity prices from other competing generation
alternatives. Section VIII uses the fair return price for the best possible
case of nuclear operating costs and industry hopes for plant construction
notes that ―judicial concepts of a fair return are few and far between.‖ He notes: (1) a fair rate of
return should be higher than one that entails confiscation, (2) no single rate of return is always fair,
and (3) public utilities are not guaranteed a fair rate of return. Id.
8. See JOEL KLEIN, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, COMPARATIVE COSTS OF CALIFORNIA
CENTRAL STATION ELECTRICITY GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES, CEC-200-2009-017-SD (Aug. 2009)
(recognizing explicitly that there are at least three different ownership structures, namely: (1)
merchant non-utility independent power generators, (2) investor owned electric utilities, and (3)
public electric utilities. Each have different risks, debt capacities, and required returns on power
generation projects); also, the different debt capacities, debt cost rates, and overall required returns
are reflected by solving for a different required price in all the summary tables for each of twentyone alternative generation technologies evaluated. See id.
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costs first to determine economic viability and then to assess the
likelihood of default. Section IX first lists methodology contributions and
then summarizes final conclusions.
II. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE NEED FOR LOW CARBON
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Concerns with climate change have led to a global focus on reducing
carbon in the atmosphere. Of particular concern is reducing the emission
of carbon from fossil fuels for the generation of electricity. However, the
reduction of carbon emissions is believed to have a number of economic
costs, including possible changes in national competitiveness. First, there
is capture or other control of carbon from current fossil fuel electricity
generation, especially coal-based electric generation. Second, it is
generally believed that, with the possible exception of wind-generated
electricity, low carbon electricity generation is simply much more
expensive than fossil fuel (especially coal-based) electricity generation. 9
The Kyoto Protocol was an attempt to coordinate carbon reductions
by obtaining national commitments for lower carbon emission targets. 10
Notably, the United States refused to ratify, 11 primarily because of the
perceived high conformity costs and asymmetric distribution of the cost
burden. 12
Since Kyoto, states seem to have varying climate change strategies,
including those aimed at electricity generation. For example, state
strategies differ even within the European Union. Germany and Spain
both represent strong state commitment to renewables by offering tax
credits and production subsidies as incentives.13 In contrast, France

9. See id. at 14–24 (providing a thorough cost projection, comparing levelized costs, and
noting that only wind and hydro have a lower cost per kilowatt-hour than coal and natural gas
generation alternatives).
10. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
22, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. (Dec. 10, 1997), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
11. See Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change
3
(Jan.
14,
2009),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/
kp_ratification.pdf
(indicating that the United States has signed but not ratified the Protocol).
12. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 27 (2007) (―By far the largest loser, in terms of the actual anticipated costs of
mandatory cuts, was the United States.‖).
13. See Mark Landler, Germany Debates Subsidies for Solar Industry, N. Y. TIMES, May 16,
2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/business/worldbusiness/16solar.html?ex=1368676800&en=781
6e306c4840eec&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink.
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already uses highly subsidized nuclear to generate approximately 80% of
its electricity.14
While the United States has not undertaken new nuclear power
plants since the 1970s, the current U.S. strategy for baseload low-carbon
electricity is to preserve the almost 20% of U.S. electricity generation
currently produced from nuclear.15 The Energy Information Agency
(EIA) has made baseload capacity projections, including projections of
additional nuclear power plant capacity. The Department of Energy
(DOE) has estimated fifty more nuclear plants by 2030 and more than
one hundred by 2050.16
The provision of financial guarantees for debt financing of the
proposed new nuclear plants is central to the current U.S. strategy. The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides for federal guarantees of debt
financing for up to 80% of a nuclear generation project.17 DOE approval
is required for a particular nuclear project to obtain the federal guarantee
of its debt. The industry views the debt guarantees as critical for
proceeding with new nuclear power plants. 18
Knowing the value and likely cost of financial guarantees is essential
to intelligent nuclear energy policy—for not only the United States but
also for the many other states now considering and/or engaging in similar
strategies. 19 In addition to policy and planning, knowing the value, cost,
14. See Steve Kidd, Nuclear in France—What Did They Get Right?, NUCLEAR ENG’G I NT’ L,
June 22, 2009, available at http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2053355.
15. See Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration: Independent Statistics and
Analysis, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2010) [hereinafter Energy Information
Administration] (providing data that summarizes Department of Energy projections of additions to
current nuclear capacity, which are provided in several places on the EIA website); see also Richard
Newell, Washington, D.C., Annual Energy Outlook 2010 Reference Case (Dec. 14, 2009), especially
Slide 20 (providing a brief current summary of this information and other past and projected
electrical energy generation); U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: I NDEPENDENT
STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010: REFERENCE CASE 20 (2009),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/speeches/newell121409.pdf.
16. See generally Energy Information Administration, supra note 15.
17. See Energy Policy Act, supra note 1.
18. The Energy Policy Act provides for guarantees of 80% of the financing of new nuclear
plants subject to DOE approval. In a speech to the Nuclear Energy Assembly, John Rowe (President
and CEO Exelon Corp and Chairman of the Board, Nuclear Energy Institute) reported on progress in
actually obtaining the DOE approval for the 80% debt guarantees for particular projects to build new
nuclear power plants. Rowe refers to the approvals ―from the Department of Energy for the loan
guarantee program, which is so essential to financing new nuclear plants.‖ John Rowe, Pres. Exelon
Corp., Speech before the Nuclear Energy Assembly: Nuclear Energy 2008: State of the Industry,
(May 6, 2008) (emphasis added). In reporting on the approvals up to the time of his speech, Rowe
adds: ―approximately $20 billion in loan volume authorized in 2008 and 2009 – a good start.‖ Id.
19. Like France, Korea is both building and seeking to build new nuclear plants. India and
the United States have negotiated cooperation for up to sixty new nuclear power plants in India. In
addition to Iran, many Middle Eastern states are seeking help in constructing and/or operating
nuclear power plants.
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and risk of financial guarantees for nuclear is important knowledge for
state utility commissions, utility executives and planners, equipmentinfrastructure suppliers, investors, and even credit rating agencies. 20
Finally, U.S. ability to produce low-carbon electricity economically is
vital to the new round of U.N.-sponsored global climate treaty
negotiations that occurred in December 2009 in Sweden. While
knowledge of and confidence in the ability to produce low-carbon
electricity are pertinent to the way the United States negotiates, they are
even more critical to obtaining Congressional approval for any treaties
developed.
Ultimately, there is a clear need to assess properly both the value and
cost of financial guarantees for new nuclear. In addition to a technically
correct economic assessment, there is a need to structure both the value
and cost assessments in terms understandable to policymakers and other
key players.
III. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL FINANCIAL GUARANTEES FOR CAPITAL
INVESTMENT PROJECTS
As already noted, the aim of this Article is to develop a framework
for assessing both the value and the cost of federal debt guarantees for
long-lived risky capital investment projects such as the 80% debt
guarantees in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. As background, this Article
reviews two prior instances of federal guarantees for capital investment
projects. Section A considers Lockheed TriStar as an example of the
value of federal debt guarantees. Section B considers the Exxon-Tosco
Colony Oil Shale Project as an example of using federal financial
guarantees to incentivize development of synthetic fuels. Section C then
analyzes and compares these two examples.
A. Example One: Federal Debt Guarantees for the Lockheed TriStar
The Lockheed TriStar is a classic example of the value of federal
debt guarantees that has received formal academic analysis. 21 Economist
Uwe E. Reinhardt’s treatment of the Lockheed TriStar is especially
20. STANDARD AND POOR’S, 2008A: THE RACE FOR THE GREEN: HOW RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS COULD AFFECT U.S. UTILITY CREDIT Q UALITY 11 (Mar. 10, 2008);
STANDARD AND POOR’S, 2008B: ASSESSING THE CREDIT RISK OF COMPETING TECHNOLOGIES FOR
NEW U.S. N UCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Aug.13, 2008); STANDARD AND POOR’S, 2008C:
CONSTRUCTION COSTS TO SOAR FOR NEW U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Oct. 15, 2008)
[collectively hereinafter STANDARD AND POOR’S] (developing credit-focused assessments of nuclear
costs and risks).
21. See generally Reinhardt, supra note 2.
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pertinent to the subsidy assessment framework proposed here for two
reasons.22 First, Reinhardt convincingly establishes that subsidy merit
and especially economic viability should use net present value capital
budgeting methods 23 rather than the simple dollar breakeven criterion
used by Lockheed. 24 The net present value capital budgeting methods
advocated by Reinhardt are the underlying valuation framework used
here to convert financing rates into fair return electricity prices. Second,
Reinhardt uses the weighted average cost of capital as the project
discount rate (fair required return for economic viability) and explicitly
recognizes uncertainty in the discount rate for both the role of the relative
use of debt and equity and for uncertainty about the economically correct
costs for debt and especially equity. As a consequence, Reinhardt uses
discount rate sensitivity analysis (a range of possible discount rates) to
treat this uncertainty in the required return as done in this Article in
Sections VII and VIII.
In 1971, both the Senate25 and House26 held hearings to assess a
request by Lockheed, a major defense contractor, for the federal
government to guarantee a $250 million bank credit line loan for $250
million. The stated purpose of the bank loan was to allow Lockheed first
to complete its in-process development of the Lockheed TriStar (at that
time, a new generation of wide-body, high-passenger-capacity, fuelefficient jet plane for which Lockheed had already invested
approximately a billion for development and other TriStar start-up
expenses) and then to finance plant construction and start-up plane
production.27 Without a guarantee, Lockheed spokesmen testified that
they could not obtain the required financing. With a guarantee, the bank
loan would cost 5% to 6%. Before Lockheed’s financing crisis, the
22. See id. at 834–35 (focusing especially on Section III-B, ―The Economic Value of the Tri
Star Program in 1971‖).
23. Capital budgeting refers to the economic evaluation of capital investment projects. See
Bierman, supra note 6; see also supra text accompanying note 6.
24. In arguing that the TriStar project was economically viable, Lockheed spokesman used
simple breakeven analysis as their measure of economic of viability. As explained well by
Reinhardt, simple breakeven analysis only measures the ability of project cash income to cover the
initial capital outlays. The deficiency of breakeven is that there is no provision for debt interest
payments let alone a fair return on invested equity.
25. See Hearings on Emergency Loan Guarantees Legislation, Parts 1 and 2 Before S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong. (1971) [hereinafter Hearings on
Emergency].
26. See Hearings on Legislation to Authorize Emergency Loan Guarantees to Major
Business Enterprise Before H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92nd Cong. (1971).
27. In testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, Lockheed
spokespersons argued that the project itself was economically sound but that Lockheed had run out
of debt capacity because of cost overruns on unrelated defense contracts. See Hearings on
Emergency, supra note 25.
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before-tax cost of debt to Lockheed was 10% to 12% annual interest cost
in the late 1960s.28 Taking the difference between the 10 to 12% cost of
debt financing without a guarantee and the 5 to 6% cost with a federal
guarantee, the federal debt guarantee would reduce the annual interest
cost for Lockheed by at least 5% to 6%. The phrase ―at least‖ refers to
the fact that Lockheed’s cost of debt would be greater in 1971 than in the
late 1960s because Lockheed was much less risky before the cost
overruns and the associated financing crisis that prompted the request for
the federal guarantee. The concern here is not the precise numerical
magnitude of the interest cost reduction from the fundamental guarantee,
but rather the fact that the reduction in interest expense was a significant
amount.
The pertinent key facts are that Lockheed was granted the guarantee,
produced the planes, and repaid the debt. Thus, the Lockheed TriStar can
be viewed as an example where a company received value without
significant out-of-pocket federal costs. The public received jobs,
preserved a major aerospace defense contractor/manufacturer, and
ensured a viable competitor for a new generation of efficient commercial
jet aircraft.
B. Example Two: Financial Guarantees for the Exxon-Tosco Colony
Shale Oil Project
The United States has previous experience with a range of subsidies
including federal financial guarantees to incentivize development of
synthetic fuels, especially shale oil development. In 1980, DOE
committed $2.616 billion to three synthetic fuels projects. The largest of
these three projects was the Exxon-Tosco Colony Oil Shale Project. It
received a financial guarantee of $1.15 billion. In a recent review of past
DOE synthetic fuels programs, Anthony Andrews notes that in 1980
Exxon bought Tosco’s interest in the project, and announced plans to
invest more than $5 billion for a planned 47,000 barrel per day plant in
Garfield County, Colorado based on the Tosco retort design. 29 However,
Andrews reports that ―after spending more than $1 billion, Exxon
announced on May 2, 1982 that it was closing the project and laying off
2,200 workers‖ even after building a company town able to house more

28. See Hearings on Emergency, supra note 25; Hearings on Legislation to Authorize
Emergency Loan Guarantees to Major Business Enterprise Before the H. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 92d Cong., First Session, (1971); see also Reinhardt, supra note 2, at 821–38.
29. See ANTHONY ANDREWS, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICES, O IL SHALE: HISTORY, I NCENTIVES, AND POLICY 10 (Apr. 13, 2006).
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than 2,000 workers.30
While the Tosco retort design was a technically feasible method for
producing synthetic crude oil, the project was abandoned because of the
cost per barrel for the synthetic shale oil relative to the current and
anticipated future market prices for crude oil. In an Article on the project
termination, Time Magazine (Time) noted that ―Exxon’s long-term
forecasts still anticipate an increase in oil prices, but not as rapid as
previously expected.‖31 R. P. Larkins, the manager of the synthetic-fuels
department at Exxon, stated ―nothing over the long-term would offset
our costs.‖32 John Lichtblau, President of Petroleum Industry Research
Foundation stated ―[t]he fact is that from a market point of view, most
synfuel projects are not economically viable.‖ 33 Even with receiving a
financial guarantee from the federal government, Exxon could not pursue
this project of developing synthetic fuels because it was not in the
company’s best economic interest.
C. Lockheed and Colony Shale Oil Analysis
Lockheed and Colony Shale Oil provide historical contrasts in the
use of federal financial guarantees. Lockheed is an example where a
financial guarantee provided a valuable financial subsidy with very little
out-of-pocket cost to the federal government. The reason for successful
production without performance on the guarantee by the federal
government was the financial viability of the TriStar project. Lockheed
could produce and sell aircraft at a profit sufficient to at least service the
guaranteed debt.
The Colony Oil Shale Project illustrates that financial guarantees can
be a high risk strategy for incentivizing development that is not
otherwise market competitive. If the financial guarantee subsidy
(whether shale oil in the 1980s or new nuclear today) is not sufficient to
ensure financial viability, then guaranteeing a high percentage of project
financing lowers the cost of abandonment; this in turn means a high
performance cost by the fundamental government and no realization of
the desired production with its intended societal benefits. Andrews’s
recent Congressional Research Service Report summarizes the
unrealized but desired societal benefits of synthetic fuels:
The United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980 (P.L. 9630. Id.
31. John S. Demott et al., Energy: Setback for Synfuel, TIME, MAY 17, 1982, available at
http://www.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,921222,00.html.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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294) established the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation ―to improve the
nation’s balance of payments, reduce the threat of economic disruption
from oil supply interruptions, and increase the nation’s security by
reducing its dependence on foreign oil.‖ The Corporation was authorized
to provide financial assistance to qualified projects that produce synthetic
fuel from coal, oil shale, tar sands, and heavy oils. Financial assistance
could be awarded as loans, loan guarantees, price guarantees, purchase
agreements, joint ventures, or combination of those types of assistance.
An energy security reserve fund was also established in the U.S.
Treasury and appropriated 19 billion to stimulate alternative fuel
production.34
While federal financial guarantees can provide support to companies
for implementing various projects, these guarantees may still not be
enough for some companies despite the social benefits the projects could
provide.
IV. VALUATION FRAMEWORKS FOR DETERMINING A FAIR RETURN
PRICE
A debt guarantee may be viewed in terms of options. There are two
pertinent options. The recipient of the guarantee has the option to
abandon the project if changes in costs, revenues, or other economic
circumstances indicate that the project is no longer economically
attractive. 35 The debt providers have the option of a federal debt
guarantee, which is itself an option to shift the obligation for financial
performance to the federal government in the event of default. 36
If a project is not financially attractive, the company holding the
guarantee can exercise its option to abandon it. With a debt guarantee,
exercising the abandonment option may have a much lower cost than
without a debt guarantee. This point is illustrated by the decision of
Exxon to stop work on the Colony Shale Oil Project. At the time that
Exxon stopped work, Exxon had invested approximately $1 billion of its
planned investment of approximately $5 billion. 37
34. ANDREWS , supra note 29, at 27 (quoting Title 1, Part B of the Energy Security Act of
1980).
35. In capital budgeting, abandonment refers to the option to terminate a project once started
if there are adverse changes in expected costs, revenue, or other economic circumstances. For more
details on abandonment, see, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 6, at 255–56.
36. See JOHN C. H ULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND O THER DERIVATIVES 507–26 (6th ed. 2006)
(providing the valuation of default protection generally).
37. The option to abandon a project and the associated cost are part of the valuation of any
capital investment project. For background on the abandonment option, readers are referred to any
introductory corporate finance text. See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 6, at 255–56.
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Given the options associated with the debt guarantee, one might try
to use option pricing methods to assess both the value of the
abandonment option and the value of the federal protection from debt
default. Option pricing is not the pertinent valuation approach. This is
true for several reasons. One is simply the complexity of nuclear
projects, including the disagreement on construction costs and operating
costs and the absence of readily usable probability distributions for these
cost inputs.38 Another pertains to understandability by policymakers,
which is difficult to achieve given the mathematical complexity
associated with option pricing. The most important reason pertains to the
two primary objectives of this Article, namely: (1) to express the value of
the financial guarantee subsidy as an electricity price so that both
policymakers and the public can understand and compare the value of
federal debt guarantees with alternative price impacting subsidies and
charges; and (2) to use the fair return price per kilowatt-hour with the
federal financial guarantee to assess economic viability and therefore
provide a framework for assessing the likelihood of default and the
associated cost of performing on the guarantee. For both of these
objectives, the logical valuation framework is the use of traditional net
present value capital investment methods to determine a fair return price.
Because traditional project analysis methods obtain our policy
objectives, it is clearly logical to use the net present value methods rather
than option pricing methods.
As noted in the Introduction, the primary purpose of this Article is to
develop and illustrate an easy-to-understand framework that uses
traditional capital investment analysis to obtain fair return prices for
nuclear projects with and without guarantees. Recall that a fair return
price is the price per kilowatt-hour that a nuclear plant would have to
charge to provide a fair return on invested capital.39 The fair return
project prices provide an easy-to-understand method for assessing project
value and viability for given assumptions about costs. For a project that
is economically viable, any good measure of the value of federal debt
guarantee is reduced to assessing the difference in the fair return
electricity prices for financing with a federal debt guarantee and without
38. Federal financial guarantees on a capital investment project like a new nuclear power
plant, both the value of the guarantee and its expected cost, are derived from several factors, which
include the current value of the project, the likely distribution of project values over time, and
especially the probability of default (option exercise) and the value distribution under default.
39. As regulated monopolies, investor-owned electric utilities are presumed to earn a fair
return on invested capital. Given invested capital and operating costs and an assumed quantity of
electricity sold, the mechanism for providing a fair return on invested capital is to set the price per
unit (price per kilowatt-hour) to provide the presumed fair return.
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any financial guarantees. Assessing financial viability with a federal debt
guarantee is a question of whether the fair return price is a market
competitive price.
In rate setting, the process of finding a fair return is applied to the
overall utility capital base and overall cash flows. This Article adapts the
fair return price setting to an individual generation project to see what
price this project would have to command to provide a fair return on
invested capital.
In a classic textbook capital budgeting problem, one obtains a
summary net present value (NPV) by discounting all project cash flows
at a discount rate, which reflects the opportunity cost of capital.40 If the
NPV is zero, the discount rate provides a fair return in the sense that the
project has an internal rate of return that is equal to the opportunity cost
of capital. If the project NPV is positive, the project provides a morethan-fair return and the assumed price of electricity in projecting revenue
could be reduced. Conversely, if the project NPV is negative, the project
provides a less-than-fair rate of return. For the project to have an internal
rate of return (IRR) equal to the discount rate, the price of electricity
assumed in projecting cash flow would have to be increased.
The above problem presents the key assumptions of this analysis.
The factors are a scenario for operating costs, an assumed value for
construction costs, and an assumed rate of capacity utilization. The result
is a fair return price for the assumed discount rate used to compute the
project NPV; or in other words, a price per kilowatt-hour that make the
project IRR equal to the discount rate (the assumed required return on
invested capital).
Rather than assuming a given price and using a discount rate to solve
for the net present value, one solves for the fair return price that makes
the net present value of the cash flows equal to zero. This fair return
price is the price per kilowatt-hour that makes the assumed discount rate
(the assumed required return on invested capital) equal to the IRR.
A financial measure of the value of the subsidy implicit in a federal
debt guarantee is simply the change in the financing cost. An alternative
price-based quantitative measure of the subsidy value associated with the
change in financing cost is the change in the fair return price. Fair return
price depends on not only the discount rate (required return) but also on
the assumed construction costs, operating costs, and capacity utilization.
For example, assume that the cost of land, licensing, and other

40. Capital budgeting refers to the evaluation of capital investment projects. See BREALEY ET
note 6, at 238–91.

AL., supra
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preconstruction costs is $500 per kilowatt of peak capacity. Assume
further that the construction cost is $5000 per kilowatt-hour of peak
capacity that is spent evenly at $1000 per year for five years. Thus, one
can focus on the difference in fair return prices with a total capital cost of
$5500, a value close to the best case current dollar cost estimate for the
license application of Florida Power & Light nuclear plant.41
As a first pass, assume that the project will sell its electricity at 13¢
per kilowatt-hour and that the plant operates at 70% capacity in year 6
(its first year of operation) and increases to 90% by year 10. Assume that
the operating cash expenses are just 49.5% of revenue (compared to
74.5% as the industry average rate of cash expenses in 2007). Because
one makes the heroic assumption that cash operating expenses are well
below the current industry average cost rate, one calls this operating cost
scenario the best possible operating cost scenario.
Exhibit 3 summarizes the cash flows with the bottom line being the
net cash flow in each year. The dotted line from year 11 to year 50
indicates that the cash flows are the same in year 10 to year 50. For
simplicity of exposition, this example uses the same value for operating
costs in all years. Using current dollar costs in each year means that the
solution procedure for the fair return price is also finding a
corresponding current dollar fair return price. 42 It reflects the fact that
electricity prices tend to change in parallel with changes in the costs of
generating electricity. It may understate slightly, however, the fair return
price. Thus, one should interpret the fair return price in this Article as the
current dollar price.
Discounting these cash flows at discount rates of 6% and 8% gives
net present values of +$660 and -$700 respectively. The positive net
present value for 6% means the project has an IRR greater than 6% when
the assumed price per kilowatt-hour is 13¢. If one solves for the price per
kilowatt-hour that gives a net present value of zero and therefore an

41. For the best case scenario in their licensing application, Florida Power & Light assumes
five years for construction time and approximately $5600 in construction costs before land and
licensing and before any inflation in materials or labor. See generally, Florida Power & Light,
Nuclear
Power
Plant
Approval/Construction
Costs,
http://www.fpl.com/environment/nuclear/approval.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2010). Here,
construction costs exclude interest or other financing charges.
42. The implicit assumption in using the current dollar projection is that prices for electricity
and the overall level of operating cash expenses inflate at roughly the same rate. If nuclear operating
prices were to inflate at a faster rate than overall electricity prices, then this simplification (made
here primarily for expositional simplicity) would understate the fair return price at a given discount
rate and would then overstate economic viability relative to a faster inflation future. In this sense,
this current dollar projection may be slighted biased in favor of indicating that nuclear is more viable
than in a future of more rapidly escalating costs.
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internal rate of return of 6%, one finds that fair return price at a required
return of 6% is just 11¢ per kilowatt-hour.
For the case of an 8% discount rate, the negative net present value
indicates that the assumed 13¢ per kilowatt-hour is not high enough to
give the project an IRR of 8%.43 Given the assumed costs, the project
can earn an 8% return only if the price is increased. Solving for the
higher price that makes the net present value zero at an 8% discount rate
gives a fair return price of 15¢ per kilowatt-hour.
This example illustrates two points. First, given assumed costs, a
higher return requires a higher price. Second, the fair return price is very
sensitive to the discount rate: increasing the required return from 6% to
8% increased the fair return price from 11¢ to 15¢ per kilowatt-hour, a
change of 4¢.
The sensitivity of the relationship between the fair required price and
the discount rate is even more dramatic if one uses discount rates of 16%
and 18%, which are illustrative of the rates that would be required
without guarantees. For 16% and 18% discount rates, the associated fair
return prices that make the net present value of all the cash flows zero are
37¢ and 43¢, respectively. Given that these prices arise in the best
possible scenario for operating costs and for relatively optimistic
construction costs, it is clear why proponents of new nuclear want
financial guarantees as the industry preferred form of subsidy: rates of
37¢ and 43¢ are clearly uneconomic given that current prices average
about 10¢ per kilowatt-hour.
One can use differences in fair return prices for discount rates
without a guarantee and with a guarantee to estimate a value for the
guarantee. If the required return were 16% without a guarantee and just
6% with a guarantee, then the associated price difference is 26¢ per
kilowatt-hour (37¢ - 11¢ = 26¢). This change in fair return price means
that the production subsidy equivalent of the implicit subsidy associated
with a change in required return from 16% to 6% is 26¢. If the market
rate were 18% and the guarantee rate were 8%, then the difference would
be production subsidy equivalent of 31¢ (46¢ – 15¢).
Whether the difference is 26¢ or 31¢, or anything close to these
amounts, it is evident that the subsidy implicit in this type of financial
guarantee is immense compared to a wind production credit of 0.5¢ per
kilowatt-hour. Likewise, it is large compared to estimates of the increase
in coal-generated electricity of about 2¢ to at most 3¢ from a tax of $45
per ton of coal burned or carbon sequestration costs of about $50 per ton
43. All electricity prices discussed here are rounded to the nearest cent.
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of coal.44
V. ESTIMATES OF SUBSIDIES FOR A RANGE OF CONSTRUCTION
COSTS
The above example used an assumed construction cost of $5000 per
kilowatt of peak capacity and $500 for land and other start-up costs,
providing for a total capital outlay of $5500 per kilowatt of peak
capacity. Given that the construction cost is a subject of disagreement,
providing the fair return price for a range of construction costs and
discount rates is useful to policymakers. Exhibit 4 summarizes the fair
return price for construction costs from $3000 to $9000, which results in
a cost range of $3500 to $9500 with land and start-up of $500 added to
the construction costs.
The difference between the fair return prices for discount rates of
18% and 8% is the production subsidy equivalent of a financial
guarantee that changes the required return on a nuclear power plant from
18% to 8%. Exhibit 4 shows that both the fair return prices and their
differences increase rapidly with an increase in the construction outlay.
Because of uncertainty about project costs, and therefore economic
viability, risk to the providers of both debt and equity financing is high.
Therefore, financing costs are high without a guarantee (about 16% to
22%),45 and much lower with a guarantee (about 6% to 10%). Even the
required returns are a subject of disagreement. As with construction cost
uncertainty, policymakers, legislators, and investors can understand how
differences in required returns changes the fair return price associated
with difference costs.
VI. FAIR RETURN PRICES FOR A RANGE OF COSTS AND DISCOUNT
RATES
Given that the United States has not undertaken any nuclear power
generation projects since the early 1970s, there is no contemporary
experience for building new nuclear power projects in the United States
at current construction and material costs and current safety standards.
Economist Mark Cooper wrote a review of estimates of nuclear
power costs by more than thirty entities between 2001 and 2009 with
estimates of construction costs (or, overnight costs) ranging from less
44. See BRIAN J. MC PHERSON, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, GEOLOGIC CARBON
AS AN APPROACH TO EMISSIONS REDUCTION & BENEFIT TO UTAH (2008).

SEQUESTRATION

45. See STANDARD AND POOR’S, supra note 20.
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than $2000 to more than $10,000 per kilowatt-hour.46 This disagreement
in overnight cost ranges complicate an assessment of how much nuclear
electricity will cost and therefore uncertainty about its economic
viability, which this Article assesses by the associated fair return price.
Uncertainty in economic viability in turn translates into uncertainty about
the value of federal financial guarantees and especially about the
potential cost of federal financial guarantees. The time trend and source
of cost estimates are both pertinent to understanding the disagreement
about construction costs.
Cooper notes a ―sharp increase in projected costs over a short period
of time.‖47 In Figure III-1, Institutional Origins and Levels of Recent
Cost Projections, 48 Cooper plots estimates of overnight costs (in 2008
dollars per kilowatt-hour) versus year of estimate. All fourteen estimates
plotted in Figure III-1 developed between 2001 and 2005 are less than
$3,500 per kilowatt-hour while 23 of the 24 estimates for 2007 to 2009
are greater than $3500. For 2009, the six estimates (rounded to the
nearest $100) range from $5,400/kwhr to $10,400/kwhr. He attributes the
sharp time trend to two factors. One factor is inflation in cement, steel,
and other construction materials at a higher rate than the increase in
overall prices. The second factor is the viewpoint and type of entity
making the projection. Early studies were made by proponents while
later studies have been by critics and third parties such as credit rating
agencies.49
In any case, there is very little consensus. This lack of agreement
indicates uncertainty and should signal high risk to policymakers and
legislators, especially in light of overruns for projects undertaken in the
1960s and 1970s. In that era all projects had actual construction costs
that were at least double the estimated projection and the average
overrun was four times the projection made in the initial authorization to
build.
Importantly, Cooper considered the assessment of operating costs.50
Of the thirty-six studies he surveyed that disclosed operating cost detail,
all but one used a very narrow subset of the operating expenses; for
example, fuel and direct operating expenses or possibly just fuel, direct

46. See MARK C OOPER, THE ECONOMICS OF N UCLEAR REACTORS: RENAISSANCE OR
RELAPSE?, VT. LAW SCHOOL, INST. FOR ENERGY AND THE ENV’ T 11, 24, 30 (June 2009), especially
Figure I-1 and Figure III-6.
47. Id. at 22.
48. See COOPER, supra note 46, at 24.
49. See STANDARD AND POOR’S, supra note 20.
50. COOPER, supra note 46, at 27–28.
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operating expenses, and direct maintenance costs. 51 Thus, while possibly
giving an indication of the cost to generate before transmission,52
distribution, and all other operating expenses (like those summarized in
Exhibit 2 for EIA standard industry income statements), these studies do
not allow a realistic assessment of the retail price that utilities would
have to charge their customers in order to provide a fair return on project
capital. It is the retail price that determines the economic viability of new
nuclear or any other competing technology.
Because the fair return price depends on the construction costs,
operating costs and capacity utilization, it seems impossible to assess the
financing subsidy without having the assessment disputed on the basis of
assumed costs and capacity utilization. One way to settle this cost
uncertainty is to resolve the problem of finding fair return prices for a
range of costs and even a range of discount rates. Exhibit 5 defines three
operating cost scenarios. The best possible case is the one used in the
previous examples, which means about 20% below current industry
average operating expenses. This best possible scenario is the one that is
most pertinent to assessing viability and therefore the likelihood of
default.
If the fair return price with a financial guarantee for best possible
operating expenses and reasonable construction costs is not a
competitive market price (at least no more than 3¢ to 5¢ above
competing alternatives), then default is a virtual certainty.
Exhibit 6 summarizes the price-rate dependency for construction
costs ranging from $2000 per kilowatt of peak capacity to $9000 per
kilowatt of peak capacity53 in steps of $1000 for a range of discount rates
with the operating cost scenario, best possible operating expenses.
Exhibit 6 illustrates two additional methodology ideas for structuring
policy decisions in a more usable and understandable form. The first idea
is simply to develop a summary fair return price response surface for a
range of construction costs and discount rates for pertinent scenarios for
operating expenses. The second idea pertains to assessing viability and
the probability of default. The best possible operating expense scenario
sets a threshold for assessing viability. If the fair return price for this
scenario cannot compete with other generation alternatives, then nuclear

51. See id.
52. This cost, usually called a Busbar cost, is useful for direct comparison of two similar
generation alternatives but is not useful for policy analysis including especially issues of financial
viability. Financial viability and the value of guarantees both depend on retail prices.
53. With land and start-up costs of $500, the total capital outlay ranges from $2500 to $9500
per kilowatt-hour of peak capacity.
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cannot compete in any operating cost scenario even with financial
guarantees. Default is a virtual certainty.
Even though a range of discount rates and costs is covered, the data
in Exhibit 6 are still dependent on the structural assumptions made in the
Stone-Adolphson spreadsheet model. 54 The point is not to argue the
correctness of that model (from the Stone-Adolphson working paper),
but rather to showcase methodology that can improve comparative policy
analysis and decision-making.
VII. SUMMARY, SYNTHESIS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Climate change and energy are complex and interrelated concepts.
The world is focused on multinational coordination and parallel
formulation of national climate-energy policy. The United States serves
as an example of a state that plans on extensive increases in the number
of new nuclear power plants. To make new nuclear power economically
viable in its private enterprise system of energy delivery, the current and
presumed form for necessary subsidies is government financial
guarantees for a high fraction of plant costs.
Financial guarantees for long-lived assets are hard to evaluate using
conventional option pricing (or insurance costing), especially when both
construction costs and operating costs are difficult to predict. When
financial guarantee values and costs are characterized by percentage
changes in financing costs, they are difficult for most policymakers,
legislators, and the general public to understand. Moreover, conventional
use of changes in financing costs makes it difficult to compare the value
and cost of subsidies as financial guarantees with other price-impacting
subsidy alternatives, such as production credits and price guarantees, as
well as cost-impacting laws such as taxes, carbon caps, and carbon
charges.
New nuclear, debate on climate treaties, formulation of natural
energy policy, and public understanding are further confused by
disagreement on construction costs, operating costs, and even the
required financing rates with and without financial subsidies. A need
exists for reliable and clear frameworks for evaluating new nuclear and
comparing it with other low-carbon energy alternatives. There is
especially a need to assess the value, potential cost, and societal risk
associated with the proposed use of government financial guarantees.

54. See Bernell K. Stone & Don L. Adolphson, A Financial-Economic Model of New Nuclear
(Working Paper No. 2(12-2009), Global Energy Management, 2009), available at http://gemx.org/.
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This Article makes three methodology contributions for greater
understandability:
(1) Fair Return Prices: Converting differences in required
returns into differences in fair return prices provides a
subsidy assessment that allows comparison with production
subsidies and other price impacting subsidies, laws, and
regulations. Moreover, price per kilowatt-hour is relatively
easy to understand and evaluate in terms of current
electricity prices.
(2) Best Case Benchmark: Using the fair return price with a
financial guarantee for best case costs to evaluate financial
viability and therefore establishing the likelihood of default,
thus the expected cost of performing on the guarantee.
(3) Sensitivity
Analysis
Framework:
Organize
cost
uncertainty/disagreement by using sensitivity analysis on
construction costs and even discount rates to obtain a fair
return price plot for pertinent ranges of costs and required
returns. This allows policy makers to see the implications of
the uncertain costs on fair return prices and therefore assess
financial viability and risks.
From the data and the analysis summarized in this Article, the
primary conclusions about proposed new nuclear with government
financial guarantees are:
(1) Potentially High Subsidy Value: The production subsidy
implied by differences in the fair return prices for high
discount rates and low discount rates is large. It is much
more than 10¢ per kilowatt hour and much more than the
production subsidy required to make wind, thermal solar,
photovoltaic solar, or geothermal into economically viable
low-carbon alternatives able to compete with coal and
natural gas.
(2) High Prices for Best Case: For a scenario of low operating
costs (20% below industry average costs) with relatively low
construction costs and discount rates, the fair return price is
much higher than current electricity rates and more than
comparably subsidized wind and solar. Therefore, nuclear
even with financial guarantees is uneconomic and entails a
high probability of default.
(3) High Probability of Costly Default: Given that the best case
fair return price is well above current electricity prices (and
probable prices even with high carbon charges), and
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considering historical construction cost overruns in the
industry and the high operating costs for current nuclear
power generation, there is a high likelihood of default. This
will create the need for the government to perform on the
guarantees as was the case with the failure of financial
guarantees for shale oil in the 1980s.
In a competitive economic system, subsidies, taxes, and controls
all change costs and thereby distort the allocation of resources relative to
the efficiency of a competitive system. In seeking to encourage noncarbon electricity generation, it is desirable to preserve competitive
mechanisms as much as possible, especially when dealing with hard to
predict competitiveness and especially future innovation required to
produce the most efficient long-run electricity production at a given level
of carbon emissions. For these reasons, it is desirable to subsidize all
alternative generation methods equally so that competition and informed
private decisions produce the most efficient electricity generation
systems. Given the negative evidence on nuclear viability cited in this
Article and the potentially high cost of government financial guarantees,
policymakers should clearly address the questions formulated below.
(1) Subsidy Distortion: Given the implied magnitude of the
financial guarantee subsidy for nuclear (more than 10¢ per
kilowatt hour), why use a much greater subsidy for nuclear
than for other noncarbon renewable energy alternatives? To
ensure efficient allocation of scarce resources, should
competing alternatives not be subsidized equally?
(2) Competitive Equality: Given that the administration of the
federal financial guarantees means selecting a few producers
that will be the guarantee beneficiaries and thus precluding
all other potential producers, why use a form of subsidy that
requires government selection of a small number of
preferred producers?
(3) Encouraged Abandonment Risk: Given that financial
guarantees, especially guarantees for a high percentage of
the capital outlays, actually encourage abandonment, why
are we using a subsidy that encourages abandonment and
high costs with no output benefit rather than a
straightforward production subsidy of so many cents per
kilowatt hour?
(4) Best Form of Subsidy: Given that financial guarantees work
well when there is a virtual certainty of economic viability
and are very costly when there is not economic viability, an
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obvious question is: why are we using financial guarantees
for nuclear production rather than performance-based output
subsidies? In particular, why not have the same time
decreasing output subsidy for all non-carbon new electricity
generation?
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Exhibit 155
Average Power Plant Operating Expenses for Major
Investor-Owned Electric Utilities: 2007, 2002, 1997
(Mills per Kilowatthour)
Plant Type

2007

2002

1997

Nuclear

9.2

8.54

11.02

Fossil Steam

3.49

2.54

2.22

Hydroelectric[1]
Gas Turbine and Small
Scale[2]

7.71

5.07

3.29

2.89

2.72

4.43

Nuclear

5.79

5.04

6.9

Fossil Steam

3.39

2.68

2.43

Hydroelectric[1]

5.17

3.58

2.49

2.53

2.38

3.43

Nuclear

5.01

4.6

5.42

Fossil Steam

24.02

16.11

16.8

—

—

—

56.69

31.82

24.94

20

18.18

Operation

Maintenance

Gas Turbine and Small Scale

[2]

Fuel

Hydroelectric

[1]

Gas Turbine and Small Scale[2]
Total
Nuclear

55. See U.S. Energy Information Administration: Independent Statistics and Analysis, Table
8.2 Average Power Plant Operating Expenses for Major U.S. Investors-Owned Electric Utilities,
1997 Through 2008 (Jan. 2010), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/ epat8p2.html.
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Exhibit 256
Revenue and Expense Statistics for Major
Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, 2007, 2002, 1997
(Million Dollars)
Description

2007

2002

1997

Utility Operating Revenues

282,875

219,389

215,083

Electric Utility

251,959

200,135

195,898

Other Utility

30,305

19,254

19,185

252,216

188,745

182,796

Electric Utility

223,297

171,291

165,443

Operation

161,939

116,374

104,337

Production

128,914

90,649

80,153

Cost of Fuel

42,178

24,132

31,861

Purchased Power

78,124

58,828

37,991

Other

8,632

7,688

10,301

Transmission

6,095

3,494

1,915

Distribution

3,870

3,113

2,700

Customer Accounts

4,843

4,165

3,767

Customer Service

2,959

1,821

1,917

Sales

249

261

501

Administrative and General

14,933

12,872

13,384

Maintenance

13,675

10,843

12,368

Depreciation

18,662

17,319

23,072

Taxes and Other

27,839

26,755

25,667

Other Utility

28,347

17,454

17,353

30,659

30,644

32,286

Utility Operating Expenses

Net Utility Operating Income

56. See U.S. Energy Information Administration: Independent Statistics and Analysis, Table
8.1 Revenue and Expense Statistics for Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utilities (Jan. 2010),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat8p1.html.
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Exhibit 3
Table Illustrating Project Cash Flows per Kilowatt-hour of
Nuclear Capacity:
The Case of $5000 Construction Costs, Best Possible Case for
Operating Expenses
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

..

50

.
Land

-500

..

Constructio

-

-

-

-

-

..

n Costs

1000

1000

1000

1000

1000

.

.

Revenue

797

85

911

968

4
Purchased

102

102

102

..

102

5

5

5

.

5
-11

-34

-29

-23

-17

-11

-11

-11

..

Operating

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

..

-

Expense

473

47

484

490

496

496

496

.

496

427

478

529

529

529

..

529

Power

.

8
Net

-

-

-

-

-

1500

1000

1000

1000

1000

324

37
5

.

Exhibit 3 Notes:
In this projection, the assumed $5000 construction cost is spread equally in the assumed 5 years to
build, $1000 in year 0 to year 4.
Capacity utilization is assumed to grow from 70% in year 6 in increments of 5% per year to the
target level of 90% in year 10 and to remain at 90% until the end of year 50.
This example does not assume a decommissioning cost, a reserve for processing nuclear waste,
incremental working capital for increased production, or even that the debt is repaid at the end of the
project. Adding in these uses of cash would increase the fair return price above the values computed
here.

108

WINTER 2009

Assess the Value

Exhibit 4
An Illustrative Increase in the Production Subsidy Value of a
Financial Guarantee
for a range of Construction Costs for the Best Possible Operating
Expense Scenario
Construction
costs
Fair
Return
Price: 18%
Fair
Return
Price: 8%
Guarantee
Value

3500

4500

5500

6500

7500

8500

9500

28

36

43

57

58

66

74

10

13

15

18

21

24

26

18

23

28

29

37

42

48

Exhibit 4 Notes:
The column labeled 5500 is the combination of land and construction costs that was used previously
in Exhibit 3. In this exhibit, we are summarizing how the fair return price changes with a change in
construction costs in increments of $1000s.
Same purchased power and operating expense.

Exhibit 5
Summary-Overview of Three Scenarios for Operating Expenses
Scenario

% Revenue

Explanation of Differences

Best Possible

All-in costs are

Purchased power costs are set at 10% (percent of sales)

58% of revenue

compared to an industry average of 27.6% (percent of
sales).
Maintenance is much lower than reported in EIA data
such as the summary in Exhibit 2 to the other tables at
9.7% (percent of sales).

Industry Average

All-in costs are

Purchased power is 27.6% (percent of sales)

70-78% of

Maintenance is 13.1% (percent of sales)

revenue
Realistic Nuclear

All-in costs are

Purchased power is 27.6% (percent of sales)

between 78-88%

Maintenance is 14% (percent of sales)

Revenues
Exhibit 5 Notes:
Bernell Stone, Troy Carpenter, and Ricardo Torres estimate empirically the current cost of nuclear
generated electricity relative to the average price. With high statistical significance, nuclear is found
to be at least 4 cents above average, which is more than 20% above the average price of 9 ½ cents in
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Exhibit 658
Price-Cost-Rate Response Subsurface for Baseload Nuclear for
the Case of Reference Scenario Operating Costs

57. See Bernell K. Stone, J. Troy Carpenter, & Ricardo A. Torres, How Variation in
Electricity Generation Mix Explains Well State-By-State Variation in Electricity Prices: Empirical
Evidence on the Very High Current Cost of Nuclear Generated Electricity (Brigham Young Univ.,
Marriott Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper, 2009).
58. Bernell K. Stone & Donald L. Adolphson, A Financial-Economic Assessment of New
Nuclear Power (Brigham Young Univ., Marriott Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper, 2009).
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